ব্রি. জেনারেল (অব.) শরিফ আজিজ-এর লেখা একটি নাতিদীর্ঘ মন্তব্য প্রতিবেদন। ইংরেজী ভাষা ফেইসবুক থেকে।

///ব্রি. জেনারেল (অব.) শরিফ আজিজ-এর লেখা একটি নাতিদীর্ঘ মন্তব্য প্রতিবেদন। ইংরেজী ভাষা ফেইসবুক থেকে।

ব্রি. জেনারেল (অব.) শরিফ আজিজ-এর লেখা একটি নাতিদীর্ঘ মন্তব্য প্রতিবেদন। ইংরেজী ভাষা ফেইসবুক থেকে।

MY RESPONSE IN RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON MY ARTICLE ON BDR CARNAGE
Brig Gen Sharif Aziz

MY RESPONSE IN RESPONSE TO
COMMENTS ON MY ARTICLE ON
BDR CARNAGE

1. Very pertinent questions have been raised and also answered by Mr. Mahfooz and his friend (my respected senior in Faujdarhat Cadet College). However we need to know whether the highest military command was assertive & proactive or not on that fateful day; whether they had tried to seize the INITIATIVE or not; whether they had a quick ‘Appreciation’ of the situation (we call it Military Appreciation to arrive at a ‘Course of Action’) or not; whether they had recommended a ‘Blitzkrieg’ type operation to the highest authority or not? All these needs to be known before we really apportion blame on the highest command of military.

2. On the other hand if they were only onlookers, naive and nervous, and over powered by “Tapas-Azam – Sahara-Nanak” syndicate, then it was purely a military failure. The military ought to have sorted the matter based on ‘Military Appreciation’ and use best judgment and discretion, when life of so many officers were at stake and ultimately met with disaster

3. In this particular case it was a clear cut Mutiny and the MBML (Manual of Bangladesh Military Law) is explicit in spelling out that a Mutiny if not suppressed by hard hitting military action-then the onlookers are also considered taking part in the mutiny. It ought to have been known to the military leaders that a mutiny is to be crushed only through armed counter offensive. The military command should have resigned if their recommendations were not heeded. (Yes it is easily said than done).

4. Therefore we also need to know the CAS’S note, memo, minutes, memorabilia to the Governmement recommending measure to quell the rebellion. The role of CAS, CGS, PSO, DGFI, Defence Advisor to Prime Minister needs to be critically analyzed on that day. Were the military command influenced or immobilized by directive from the UN systems, Defence Advisor of neighboring countries, all these needs to be taken into consideration before we point our fingers to the ‘Conspiracy Theory’ behind BDR massacre as now raised by some interested quarters.

5. General Moin, the then CAS, showed enough courage and initiative in extending the tenure of the CTG from 03 months to 24 months. He also pursued a Mission (Not mandated) to turn a “Rice eating nation into a Potato eating nation”. Were these actions by the Army Chief authorised by any Government? If he could show so much enthusiasm & zeal in pursuing these Missions, he and his command have to take the sole responsibility in not fulfilling Mission as spelt out in the MBML in quelling Mutiny type rebellion by the BDR Jawans on 25th February 2009. So let us have a very positive, professional approach & attitude towards the subject “BDR CARNAGE” and draw lessons for the future. There is no scope for the military to ignore the subject based on any kind of fear or fervour.

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